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1. Solomonoff’s theory of universal prediction is an offspring of Carnap’s
program of inductive logic. It is particularly close to the conception of
Carnap’s program that Putnam challenged in his diagonal argument.
(Chapter 1.)
2. The Solomonoff-Levin measure can be defined as a universal transfor-
mation of any given continuous computable measure. Equivalently, it
can be defined as a Bayesian mixture with computable prior over any
acceptable enumeration of all lower semi-computable measures. This
equivalence can be called a representation theorem. (Chapter 2.)
3. A Bayesian mixture, including the Solomonoff-Levin definition, can
be interpreted as operating under a particular inductive assumption,
relative to which it can be said to be reliable; or as an aggregating
method over a pool of competing prediction methods, relative to which
it can be said to be optimal. (Chapter 3.)
4. The Solomonoff-Levin definition can be understood as an attempt
to escape Putnam’s diagonal argument. In the end, however, the
Solomonoff-Levin definition fails to escape diagonalization. The Solo-
monoff-Levin predictor is not a universally reliable method, nor a uni-
versally optimal method. (Chapter 4.)
5. There can be no universal prediction method. (Part II.)
6. The Solomonoff-Levin definition does not lead to a justification of Oc-
cam’s razor. (Chapter 5.)
7. The Solomonoff-Levin definition does not give a convincing formaliza-
tion of Occam’s razor. (Chapter 5.)
8. Vovk’s proposed definition, a generalization of the Solomonoff-Levin
definition, does not give a convincing notion of predictive complexity.
(Chapter 6.)
9. Algorithmic information theory falls short of giving a notion of intrinsic
complexity in the context of prediction. (Part III.)
10. Negative results represent progress, too.
